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PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
Volume 12 Spring 1995 Number 2
A "New Breed" of Treaty:
The United Nations Convention
on Biological Diversity
BY PROFESSOR CATHERINE TINKER*
The United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity'
(Treaty or Convention) entered into force on December 29,
1993. One of the unique things about this Convention is the
speed with which it was negotiated, which was a record due
to the desire to produce a document for signing at the United
Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio
de Janeiro, Brazil. 2 When the Treaty was opened for signa-
ture at the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, on June
5, 1992, it was signed by a record number, 157 States. By
early October 1993, approximately forty nations had ratified
* Visiting Associate Professor of Law, University of South Dakota School
of Law, 1994-95; Associate Professor of Law, Chapman University School of
Law, Orange, California, 1995-present.
1. Convention on Biological Diversity of the United Nations Conference on
the Environment and Development, opened for signature June 5, 1992, U.N.
Doc. DPI/1307, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 818 [hereinafter Biological Diversity].
2. Only five negotiating sessions were held in 1991 and 1992. There were
major problems and areas of disagreement literally up until the last night in
Nairobi in the final negotiating session; Dr. Tolba, the Executive Director of
United Nations Environment Programme, took a direct hands-on approach to
finally concluding the treaty negotiating in late May, which resulted in the doc-
ument that was sent on to Rio at the beginning of June, 1992, a very tight time
frame. The Law of the Sea treaty, by comparison, took over two decades, with
formal negotiating sessions lasting nine years. Edith Brown Weiss, Interna.
tional Environmental Law: Contemporary Issues and the Emergence of a New
World Order, 81 GEo. L. J. 675, 685 (1993).
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the Convention, permitting the treaty to enter into force at
the end of 1993.3 The first Conference of the Parties (COP)
was held from November 28 to December 9, 1994 in Nassau,
Bahamas.4 The seventy-five nations who ratified the Con-
vention attended the meeting; in attendance were also other
states attending as observers without the ability to vote and a
number of non-governmental organizations.
The new legal obligations created by the Convention on
Biological Diversity involve both principles of international
law and a commitment to adopt national legislation. Ambi-
guity remains in the final text of the Convention, and some
areas are still open to interpretation through the Conference
of the Parties or national legislation. In a joint introduction
to a volume published by the International Union for the
Conservation of Nature (IUCN) and the International Acad-
emy of the Environment in Geneva, the Convention on Bio-
logical Diversity is called:
. . . simply an enabling document and treaty. It sets out
what governments have agreed on regarding mutual sup-
port to national efforts to conserve the wealth of the planet,
and collaboration to enable biological resources to be devel-
oped and used to the maximum possible benefit of people.5
Dr. Andronico Adede has noted the appearance in inter-
national law of a "new breed" of treaties to integrate issues of
environment and development;6 the Biodiversity Treaty is a
perfect example. These new treaties balance the needs and
concerns of developing countries against the goals of industri-
3. By the treaty's own terms, the treaty would enter into force "on the
ninetieth day after the date of deposit of the thirtieth instrument of ratification,
acceptance, approval or accession." Biological Diversity, supra note 1, art. 36(1).
A total of 106 states have ratified or acceded to the treaty as of December 6,
1994.
4. The second Conference of the Parties met in Bali in November, 1995.
5. MARTIN HOLDGATE & BERNARD GIOVANNINI, Biodiversity Conservation:
Foundations for the 21st Century, in WIDENING PERSPECTIVES ON BIODIVERITY
3, 4 (Anatole F. Krattiger, et al. eds., 1994).
6. Andronico Adede, International Environmental Law: The Treaty Sys-
tem from Stockholm (1972) to Rio (1992), PACE ENVTL. L. REV. (forthcoming, fall
1995).
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alized countries and find a balance or compromise. The pro-
gress that has been made in just twenty years in
international environmental law-making has resulted in the
treaty negotiation process becoming a more level playing field
for Third World delegates. There has also been an expansion
in the process that brings in non-governmental organizations
and recognizes the role of local communities, indigenous peo-
ple and other major groups, especially women, who are abso-
lutely essential to the implementation of any of these
sustainable development treaties.
A real shift is visible in treaty-making between the time
of the Stockholm Conference and the Rio Conference. For ex-
ample, unlike any earlier multilateral sustainable develop-
ment treaty, the preambular language to the United Nations
Convention on Biological Diversity recognizes the vital role
that women play in the conservation and sustainable use of
biological diversity and affirms the need for the full participa-
tion of women at all levels of policy-making and implementa-
tion for biological diversity conservation. It is the only
multilateral treaty that acknowledges a fundamental link be-
tween women's participation and the implementation of the
treaty itself. The philosophical, legal and theoretical
resonances of the term "diversity" obviously imply a respect
for the variety of life, a recognition of a non-hierarchical sys-
tem in which all of the parts are honored, and where mere
size, economic value, gender, race, class, or nationality are
not the determining factors of entitlement. It is an ecosystem
approach 7 to international law-making.
In the case of biological diversity, the Convention recog-
nizes the value of all the components of biodiversity in the
way they work together to create an ecosystem and accepts as
7. An ecosystem approach to conservation supersedes concerns for only a
single species or habitat. Earlier wildlife protection treaties such as the migra-
tory bird treaties have now been complemented by treaties like the Biological
Diversity based on principles of conservation biology. CONSERVATION BIOLOGY:
AN EVOLUTIONARY-ECOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE (Michael E. Soule & Brice A. Wil-
cox eds., 1980); CONSERVATION BIOLOGY: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF NATURE
CONSERVATION, PRESERVATION, AND MANAGEMENT (Peggy L. Fiedler & Subodh
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a goal that all the components must be conserved and sus-
tainably used. The Treaty, moreover, considers what this
might mean and how the conservation and sustainable use of
biological diversity might be achieved. More importantly, the
Treaty recognizes a third objective, which is the equitable
sharing of the benefits of biodiversity, achieved by the trans-
fer of technology and by financing.8
The World Conservation Union because of its prepara-
tion of the first draft of this Treaty should be credited with
the Treaty's initiation. IUCN used principles of conservation
biology as the underpinnings of this new international law. A
very recent development in international law-making in-
volves using scientific knowledge from biologists and other
scientists before bringing in the lawyers to prepare a draft.
Then, at the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee ses-
sions, the diplomats take over, very few of whom are interna-
tional lawyers. These diplomats include a very small
informal legal subcommittee of government delegates that
met during the Biodiversity Treaty's final negotiating session
and were constrained by official instructions from their gov-
ernments. That may explain a few of the ambiguities in the
text of the treaty, and suggest ways to clarify the meaning of
some turgid language that crept into the final text.
Overall, the Convention on Biological Diversity is a far-
reaching and ambitious instrument of international law,
which will be of increasing importance in the next century if
the political will exists to implement its provisions. This
Treaty balances the self-interest of one group of nations who
have something they value and can offer to others, namely a
rich supply of genetic resources, and the self-interest of an-
other group of nations who have their own resource that they,
in turn, can offer to the first group, such as technology and
financing. Each group has an interest in acquiring what the
other has. In the language of this Treaty, the trade-off is be-
tween access to genetic resources, on the one hand, and ac-
cess to the transfer of technology and the benefits of equitable
sharing of the resources, on the other hand. The Convention
8. Biological Diversity, supra note 1, art. 1.
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on Biological Diversity represents the first time this kind of
balance has been codified in binding treaty law and is a sig-
nificant departure from the old model of top-down treaty-
making where economically weaker parties were expected to
sign on the dotted line when presented with a final text. The
Biodiversity Treaty marks a stage of significant growth of in-
ternational environmental law in the codification of Principle
21 of the Stockholm Declaration, 9 which recognizes national
sovereignty over natural resources and the responsibility not
to harm the territory of other States or areas beyond national
jurisdiction. 10 The Biodiversity Treaty copies Stockholm
Principle 21 verbatim in the text of the treaty and, therefore,
becomes binding on all parties, rather than being mere "soft
law" or non-binding declaratory language."1
I. Definitions and Scientific Principles
The Convention defines biodiversity as:
the variability among living organisms from all sources in-
cluding, inter alia, terrestrial, marine and other aquatic
ecosystems and the ecological complexes of which they are
part; this includes diversity within species, between spe-
cies, and of ecosystems.' 2
This concept evolved from the need to expand the protection
offered by a series of regional1 3 and multilateral14 treaties
designed to protect species such as migratory birds and eco-
9. The Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the
Human Environment was adopted by the U.N. Conference on the Human Envi-
ronment at Stockholm on June 16, 1972. Stockholm Declaration on the Human
Environment, at 2-65, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Rev. 1 (June 16, 1972), re-
printed in 11 I.L.M. 1417 (1972) [hereinafter Stockholm Declaration].
10. Id. Princ. 21.
11. Compare Biological Diversity, supra note 1, art. 3 with Stockholm Dec-
laration, supra note 9, Princ. 21.
12. Biological Diversity, supra note 1, art. 2.
13. E.g., the African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natu-
ral Resources, the ASEAN Agreement on the Conservation of Nature and Natu-
ral Resources, the Berne Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife
and Natural Habitats, and the Western Hemisphere Convention. See MuLTI-
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systems such as wetlands. 15 By setting aside protected areas
or attempting to regulate trade in endangered species, only
piecemeal conservation was achieved, which was often too lit-
tle too late.
The Convention on Biological Diversity is grounded in a
broad ecosystem approach to conservation and sustainable
use of biological diversity. As the World Charter for Nature16
recognized in 1982, "life depends on the uninterrupted func-
tioning of natural systems which ensure the supply of energy
and nutrients."'7 Preserving species alone is not enough to
protect biological diversity. Biologists and ecologists have
discovered the importance of ecosystems, as corridors linking
necessary habitats to support numbers of birds, animals, and
plants of different species, and as rich depositories of bacte-
ria, microorganisms, and species not yet identified by
humans with unimaginable value.
Understanding the interrelationships and dependencies
of these varied forms of life within ecosystems helps explain
why preserving species alone is not enough to achieve the
goal of conservation and sustainable use of biological diver-
sity. Indeed, a species-focused effort divorced from the
ecosystem may be doomed to failure once habitat is reduced
or variety between and within species and ecosystems is lost.
Some current thinking suggests that a "species-orientation"
for law is scientifically suspect, due to the controversy over
what actually constitutes a species as well as disputes, over
14. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild
Fauna and Flora, Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, T.I.A.S. No. 8249, 993 U.N.T.S.
243, reprinted in 12 I.L.M 1085 (1973) [hereinafter CITES]. For more about
CITES see John L. Garrison, The Convention on International Trade in Endan-
gered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) and the Debate Over Sustaina-
ble Use, 12 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 301 (1994).
15. Convention on Wetlands of International Importance Especially Water-
fowl Habitat, done Feb. 2, 1972, 996 U.N.T.S. 245 (1976), reprinted in 11 I.L.M.
969 (1972) (entered into force Dec. 21, 1975) (done in Ramsar, Iran). See
Staunton L.T. Golding, Beyond the Ramsar Convention a Proposal for the Inter-
national Protection of Wetlands Through Binding Regional Agreements, 3 CoLO.
J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 359 (1992).
16. World Charter for Nature, G.A. Res. 37/7, U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess., Supp.
No. 51, U.N. Doc. A/37/51 (1982), reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 455 (1982).
17. Id.
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how useful the distinctions may be, especially in light of the
overwhelming number of species which have not yet been cat-
alogued, identified, or studied in virtually every ecosystem
around the globe.
Nature itself is not static. Whether in response to
human activity or untouched by human hands, natural eco-
systems are resilient. Biologists and others have given us the
tools to recognize that much of this adaptability is due to the
diversity of life itself. Nature selects the species possessing
certain traits which allow survival under certain conditions.
When drought, overpopulation, temperature or disease alter
those conditions, animal and plant species must possess both
species diversity and population diversity to adapt, or they
will expire. Diversity is the best guarantee of survival of life
on this planet. The danger in destroying biological diversity
is that the pool of genes in reserve - the recessive genes,
genes for traits not currently in demand, or genes found in
wild flora or fauna - will be diminished. Then in some fu-
ture crisis, nature may not be able to regenerate or respond to
changing conditions and some life forms, maybe even human
life, will become extinct. Commenting on marine biodivers-
ity, over forty years ago Rachel Carson described an area of
creative ferment and fertility in the oceans:
As between tropical and polar regions, the differences
in the kinds and abundance of life are tremendous...
Sea life in the tropics, then, is intense, vivid, and infi-
nitely varied. In the cold seas it proceeds at a pace slowed
by the icy water in which it exists, but the mineral richness
of these waters largely a result of seasonal overturn and
consequent mixing makes possible the enormous abun-
dance of the forms that inhabit them...
And wherever two currents meet, especially if they dif-
fer sharply in temperature or salinity, there are zones of
great turbulence and unrest, with water sinking or rising
up from the depths and with shifting eddies and foam lines
at the surface. At such places the richness and abundance
of marine life reveals itself most strikingly. 18
18. RACHEL CARSON, THE SEA AROUND Us 22-23 (1951).
19951
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The rich biological diversity found in tropical forests,
oceans, coral reefs, and wetlands is a veritable warehouse of
genetic variability. Genetic material enables species to adapt
to changing climate and moisture conditions or to resist dis-
ease and pests. The economic value of biodiversity as a natu-
ral resource is now beginning to be recognized and may
someday be measured to exceed the economic value of devel-
opment, which produces short-term income at the cost of de-
stroying biodiversity. Nonetheless, the Convention's
requirement for environmental impact assessments to con-
sider the effect of a proposed development project on biodiver-
sity is a procedure which is designed to illuminate the value
of biodiversity for policy-makers and to involve the local com-
munity. Economists have not identified the tools by which
this valuation can be done consistently and accurately,
stymied in part by the scientific uncertainty about what
genes, species, and habitats exist within a given ecosystem,
or what effect the absence of any one organism may have on
the health and viability of the entire ecosystem. To this end,
the Convention mandates both an extensive cataloguing ef-
fort within each Contracting Party's territory and a program
of data collection, research, and training.19
Sustainable development need not and should not be an
attempt to freeze everything the way it is right now, preserve
it in amber, or create a museum. In nature, life forms evolve,
adapt, change, and die. Intervention, by human activity
precipitously alters the environment. The better approach is
to use resources carefully, and only where the effects of such
use can be predicted and controlled. If the effects of human
activity on ecosystems, genes, and species cannot be known
for sure, the precautionary principle20 can serve as the pa-
rameter to conserve these components of biological diversity,
until the state of human knowledge develops to safely pro-
ceed with their use. Sustainable development is, thus, a very
19. Biological Diversity, supra note 1, art. 12.
20. See, e.g., DAVID FREESTONE, The Precautionary Principle, in INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW AND GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE 21 (Robin Churchill & David Free-
stone eds., 1991).
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dynamic concept, the whole point of which is to preserve the
adaptability of life on the planet.
The idea of keeping seed banks, for example, is to have
something in reserve for the future. Monocultures are not
very sustainable. Most of the commercial hybrid seed corn of
the United States is grown in the Midwest, for example,
based on one strain of corn. When a disease or a pest threat-
ens that strain of corn, there is serious trouble for farmers
and people in much of the world who depend on that source
for food. 21 The idea of keeping the adaptability and variety of
life forms alive is a very significant one, mandated by the
Treaty as obligations of in situ22 and ex situ23 conservation of
biological resources. Certain ex situ conservation sites, such
as the Missouri Botanical Gardens 24 or Kew Gardens 25 in
London, England, for centuries maintained specimens of
plants from all over the world. The Treaty addresses the
political effect of these vestiges of colonialism by determining
a preference for in situ conservation, with ex situ conserva-
tion occurring in the country of origin of the species. It is a
move away from one centralized source which may not itself
be very sustainable. If a disaster wiped out Kew Gardens,
some other backup repository is needed. It is more logical to
develop one in the country of origin of the species, while also
developing and training scientists to use research facilities
there. The Treaty is moving in a far-reaching way towards
an equitable balance affecting many aspects of life and redis-
tribution of scarce resources.
The value of biological diversity is difficult to put into
monetary terms, although its economic value as a natural re-
21. A species of wild maize growing in the highlands of Mexico was crossed
with North American hybrid corn.
22. Biological Diversity, supra note 1, art. 9.
23. Biological Diversity, supra note 1, art. 8.
24. See William Allen Post, $20 Million Drive Begun For Garden, ST. Louis
POST, Feb. 24, 1993, at IA; William Allen Post, Botanical Garden's Wish List
Grows; Goal Increased by $13 Million, ST. Louis POST, Mar. 12, 1993, at 3A.
25. See Stephen Powell, Unworldly Kew Turns Over a New Leaf, REUTER
AsIA-PAcIFIc Bus. REP., Dec. 27, 1992.
1995]' 199
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source is beginning to be recognized. 26 Some economists talk
about "contingent valuation."27 Others talk about the "intrin-
sic value" of biodiversity, such as its spiritual and ethical di-
mension, or its existence value. 28 Proponents of this view
may share an anthropomorphic concern about what benefits
biodiversity brings directly to humans; they may address
both biological and cultural diversity; they may consider a
broader view of the value of all life forms, including the
smallest microorganism or bacteria, regardless of its known
or potential use by humans. From a biological and an anthro-
pocentric point of view, perhaps the most important value of
biodiversity is that it provides a storehouse of genetic mate-
rial, which are raw resources essential to the planet's ability
to adapt to change.29
Linked to this exploration of the value of biodiversity is
the search for causes of its loss, principally through human
activities. Economic factors essential to growth and im-
proved standards of living unfortunately destroy crucial habi-
tats, drive some wild species toward extinction, or encourage
monoculture in domesticated species. Each one reduces the
planet's biodiversity and alters the delicate balance of ecosys-
tems. Population growth and its attendant pressures on
26. WALT REID ET AL., BIODivERsrrY PROSPECTING: USING GENETIC RE-
SOURCES FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 6-18 (1993).
27. Jeffrey C. Dobbins, The Pain and Suffering of Environmental Loss: Us-
ing Contingent Valuation to Estimate Nonuse Damages, 43 DUKE L.J. 879, 882
(1994). Contingent valuation is a method used by environmental economists in
an attempt to estimate the public's view of environmental resources by creating
"... a hypothetical market in which people are asked how much they are willing
to pay to preserve or protect a given resource." Id. See, Report of the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Panel on Contingent Valua-
tion, 58 Fed. Reg. 4601, 4603 (1993) [hereinafter NOAA Panel Report]. For a
more detailed analysis of the methodology, see ROBERT C. MITCHELL & RICHARD
T. CARSON, USING SURVEYS TO VALUE PUBLIC GOODS: THE CONTINGENT VALUE
METHOD (1989).
28. Lee P. Breckinridge, Protection of Biological and Cultural Diversity:
Emerging Recognition of Local Community Rights in Ecosystems Under Inter-
national Environmental Law, 59 TENN. L. REV. 735 (1992). For a further expla-
nation of "intrinsic value," see JEFFREY A. McNEELY ET AL., CONSERVING THE
WORLD'S BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY 17-8 (1990); see also NOAA Panel Report, supra
note 27, at 4602.
29. E. WILSON, THE DIVERSITY OF LIFE (1992).
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scarce natural resources add to the threat. To reverse this
trend, stabilized population, increased education and ecologi-
cal training, and more equitable distribution of the planet's
resources may result in better conservation and sustainable
use of biological resources. The application of the precaution-
ary principle in international law may avoid actions that
needlessly reduce biodiversity.30 Careful application of bio-
technology may in some cases serve as a bridge between con-
servation and sustainable utilization of biodiversity, as when
cross-breeding increases yields of food crops or domestic
animals.3 1
While the treaty does not explicitly analyze either the
value or the causes of loss of biodiversity, it is grounded in a
global perspective which recognizes biodiversity as a common
concern of humankind. The three objectives of the Conven-
tion on Biological Diversity outline the goals that the interna-
tional community, individual states, and local communities
must seek to implement: the conservation and sustainable
use of biological diversity, and the equitable sharing of its
benefits. 32
The economic incentive for biological diversity conserva-
tion is clear to pharmaceutical companies, agribusiness, and
seed companies. Biological Diversity prospecting is poten-
tially worth billions of dollars. For example, if a drug com-
pany can discover a medicinal plant growing in a Brazilian
rain forest, isolate the gene with healing properties and
reproduce it synthetically in the lab, the company can manu-
facture a drug that will earn large amounts of money.33 This
30. JEFFREY McNEELEY, Critical Issues in the Implementation of the Con-
vention on Biological Diversity, in WIDENING PERSPECTIVES ON BIODIvERsiTY 7,
10 (Anatole F. Krattiger et al. eds., 1994).
31. Id.
32. Biological Diversity, supra note 1, art. 1.
33. Scientists have found a chemical which inhibits HIV in a tropical vine.
Susan Katz Miller, High Hopes Hanging on a 'Useless' Vine; Discovery in Came-
roon of a Plant Which May Cure HIV Infection, NEW SCIENTIST, Jan. 16, 1993,
at 12. A treatment for ovarian cancer, Taxol, was found in the bark of a Pacific
yew tree. Gary Stix, Back To Roots: Drug Companies Forage For New Treat-
ments; Plant Derived Pharmaceuticals, Sci. AM., Jan. 1993, at 142.
1995]
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process will be protected by intellectual property laws, which
the Treaty addresses in some contradictory phrases.
Intellectual property laws are claimed by proponents to
encourage development, research, and the advancement of
knowledge by creating private property rights. The Treaty
claims to observe and respect intellectual property rights. At
the same time, the Treaty freely calls for the equitable shar-
ing of the benefits of biodiversity. How can this work? In the
example above, someone in a local community, the local
healer, told the drug company representative about the medi-
cal plant or showed it to them. Perhaps a member of an In-
dian tribe took the drug company representative into the
jungle. If this "discovery" resulted ultimately in a successful
drug being manufactured by the drug company, according to
the Treaty, royalties need to be paid back to the source of that
genetic resource. 34
II. Legal Duties to Conserve and Sustainably Use
Biological Diversity
A. Duty of Conservation and Sustainable Use of Biological
Diversity
One of the challenges to lawyers and policy-makers is to
apply scientific understanding of the threats to biological di-
versity to law and decision-making. In the case of the Con-
vention on Biological Diversity, a new norm or binding
obligation under international law is created: the conserva-
tion and sustainable use of biological diversity. While the
meaning of this obligation will become clearer as Contracting
Parties draft national biodiversity strategies and legislation,
the basic obligation itself has been recognized in the Treaty.
Trying to create rules for a subject that is as broad as biologi-
cal diversity is extremely ambitious and calls for new think-
34. The details will be worked out in the Conference of Parties to the
Treaty. The institutional system established by the Treaty is that a body called
the Conference of the Parties will meet and vote on matters of implementation
and monitoring of the Treaty. Some questions have been raised as to how the
benefits can be shared in ways that use indigenous people's knowledge without
destroying their traditional way of life.
12https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol13/iss1/8
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ing about international law. This new global Treaty
recognizes biodiversity as a resource for the preservation of
life on the entire planet, and requires global cooperation to
conserve and sustainably use it. Biodiversity is certainly not
bounded by national territorial boundaries; imagine microor-
ganisms halting at a national border, or the difficulty of de-
tecting seeds or plants being carried through customs by
travelers since the earliest human voyages. Yet, implemen-
tation of the Biological Diversity Treaty relies principally on
national legislation and strategies. It is a pragmatic ap-
proach and one that can and will work; however, it funda-
mentally seems to be a contradiction in terms.
International law is moving away from a narrow concep-
tion of national sovereignty, especially on transboundary en-
vironmental issues. Yet, national governments themselves
must draft strategies and plans to implement the Treaty.
The approach is sound, as governments which otherwise may
never have considered biodiversity must now include envi-
ronmental impact assessments of the effect on biodiversity of
a proposed activity in their national planning process. Ques-
tions about Treaty compliance, lack of global environmental
standards, and the responsibilities of national governments
vis-&-vis the private sectors within their nations must subse-
quently be addressed by States who otherwise would not con-
sider such topics. The final assessment of the Treaty's
effectiveness will depend on what kind of national legislation
on the conservation and sustainable use of biological diver-
sity is enacted and enforced. The IUCN Law Commission in
Bonn has been drafting some models and providing technical
assistance to States. In addition, the Interim Secretariat for
the Biodiversity Convention has been asked by States to pro-
duce models of national legislation.
Another indication of serious effort to achieve the goals of
the Convention is a commitment that may be idealistic but
nevertheless is real and binding. This commitment involves
the responsibility of States not to harm the territory of an-
other State or the territory beyond national jurisdiction.
Even though a nation state has latitude to create their own
legislation and strategies, those that signed and ratified the
1995] 203
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Convention have accepted its legal responsibilities and obli-
gations. Since 1972, states have formulated the concept of
responsibility accompanying sovereignty in Principle 21.
Now, twenty years later, it is binding international law. Any
national legislation has to comply with the obligations in Ar-
ticle 3 of the Treaty, the responsibility not to harm the terri-
tory of other States. In addition, any domestic legislation or
strategy must be consistent with Article 1, "Objectives of the
Treaty," the obligation to conserve and sustainably use bio-
logical diversity and to equitably share its benefits.
The placement of these overriding, overarching obliga-
tions, the Objectives, at the beginning of the Treaty is signifi-
cant for the Treaty's interpretation and provides the context
for each subsequent article. The conservation duties are sub-
stantive in the Treaty and many of them relate to our ele-
mentary knowledge of biological diversity: The numbers of
species and genes and microorganisms contained in a partic-
ular habitat, and the extent to which they may be threatened
by proposed development. Each contracting party is obli-
gated to start studying and monitoring the biological diver-
sity contained within that State, to count species, and to
create databases to share that information. Other articles of
the Convention further spell out these responsibilities, as in
Article 6 on "General Measures for Conservation and Sus-
tainable Use;" Article 8 on "In Situ Conservation;" and Article
10 on "Sustainable Use of Components of Biological Diver-
sity." Specific emphasis in the Treaty is given to in situ con-
servation, enumerating measures ranging from the
protection of natural habitats, the conservation of viable
populations of species in natural surroundings and the estab-
lishment of a system of protected areas to the rehabilitation
of degraded ecosystems, and recovery of threatened species. 35
As part of the sustainability obligations found throughout the
Treaty and collected in Article 10, States are obligated to reg-
ulate or manage biological resources found within their
territory.
35. See Biological Diversity, supra note 1, art. 8.
14https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol13/iss1/8
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B. Jurisdictional Scope
The duties undertaken by Contracting Parties within the
territory of a State are to conserve and sustain the use of the
components of biological diversity: namely, species, ecosys-
tems and genetic material. Those duties apply within the na-
tion's own territory, the exclusive economic zone and the
continental shelf. A differentiation is made in the Treaty for
duties on the high seas, in space, or other areas beyond na-
tional jurisdiction; there the Contracting Party is responsible
to control processes and activities under its jurisdiction or
control. The Treaty appears to be silent about activities of a
State or its nationals within the territory of other States.
This is one of the areas lawyers will need to look at in the
future. There is no mechanism under the Biodiversity
Treaty's express language to enable non-governmental orga-
nizations (NGOs) or individual citizens to directly challenge
an activity, a plan, or a development project if it is totally
within the territory of another State. A Contracting Party
cannot object to another Contracting Party's activity wholly
within the second State's territory, unless such activity rises
to the level of a clear breach of an international legal duty or
violates the Treaty directly.
If the development itself is going to violate the objectives
of the Treaty or if a State's Principle 21/Article 3 responsibili-
ties not to harm the territory of another State will be violated
by causing some sort of transboundary effect, there would be
a basis for triggering the Treaty's dispute resolution mecha-
nisms. The Treaty's dispute mechanisms include concilia-
tion, arbitration, and ultimately resort to the International
Court of Justice. The arbitration provisions have potential
for resolving the type of situation where economic growth im-
peratives are competing with the conservation imperatives.
The jurisdictional scope section of the Treaty sketches
out areas of responsibility whether within the territory of the
Contracting States or in areas beyond national jurisdictions
such as the high seas. Article 4 of the Convention on "Juris-
dictional Scope" imposes an obligation on States to conserve
and sustainably use the components of biological diversity
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(species, ecosystems, and genetic material) found within their
national jurisdiction, namely a nation's territory, exclusive
economic zone, and continental shelf.36 There is no extension
of those management obligations to components of biodivers-
ity located within the territory of another State or on the high
seas. As to those areas, each Contracting Party is obligated
to cooperate on matters of mutual interest. 37 Such "matters
of mutual interest could include issues associated with mi-
gratory species, shared resources, or activities causing trans-
boundary harm."38 A distinction is made regarding the
jurisdictional scope over "processes and activities" under the
jurisdiction or control of a Contracting Party, whereby the
Party is obligated to control its nationals in its own territory
and Exclusive Economic Zone or in space and on the high
seas (areas beyond national jurisdiction).39 A Contracting
Party does not appear to be obligated to control the activities
of its nationals within the territory of another State, in which
case, there is the duty to cooperate for the conservation and
sustainable use of biological diversity.40
C. Responsibility of States
A unique feature of the Biological Diversity Convention
is the approach "to biodiversity conservation from a develop-
ment perspective," 41 moving the spirit of Rio into binding in-
ternational law. Why is this unique? Since Stockholm,
international law recognized sovereign rights over natural re-
sources, while acknowledging a limitation on that right re-
garding responsibility towards others. The Convention on
Biological Diversity marks the first time this principle, Prin-
36. Biological Diversity, supra note 1, art. 4(a). See, e.g., Melinda Chandler,
The Biodiversity Convention: Selected Issues of Interest to the International
Lawyer, 4 COLO. J. INT'L ENvTL. L. & POL'Y 141, 147 (1993).
37. Biological Diversity, supra note 1, art. 5.
38. Chandler, supra note 36, at 148.
39. Biological Diversity, supra note 1, art. 4.
40. Note that activities of foreign nationals would be subject to laws and
regulations of the State in which they are present or operating.
41. Francoise Burhenne-Guilmin, An Introduction to the Convention on Bio-
logical Diversity, in WMENING PERSPECTVES ON BIODrvEsrrY, 15, 16 (Anatole F.
Krattiger et al. eds., 1994).
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ciple 21 of the Stockholm Declaration, has been included in a
multilateral Treaty, thereby becoming legally binding inter-
national law without the necessity of debating whether the
principle is customary law or not. The final text of the bi-
odiversity treaty, specifically Article 3, adopted Principle 21
verbatim, a significant step towards consensus by both devel-
oped and developing countries. Significantly under the Con-
vention, Contracting Parties do accept broad responsibility
"to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control
do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of
areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction."42 This arti-
cle works in conjunction with the responsibilities of States
with respect to their own biological resources. 43
D. Role of Non-Governmental Organizations
Non-state groups, such as non-governmental organiza-
tions, international bodies, groups of scientific or technical or
legal experts, indigenous people, women, and local communi-
ties, are also identified as contributing to the implementation
of these goals through various levels of participation. Proce-
dural rights included in the convention reflect this concern
for the involvement of global civil society,44 such as environ-
mental impact assessments and involvement in monitoring
and research.45
All States beginning a project likely to affect biodiversity,
cooperating in remediation, or providing technical assistance
must make a full assessment of the internal, transboundary,
and global environmental impacts such activities might pres-
ent. Developing States, in which most of the planet's bi-
odiversity is found, are called upon to adopt effective
domestic environmental impact assessment procedures, if
42. Biological Diversity, supra note 1, art. 3.
43. SWIG BLIxT, The Role of Genebanks in Plant Genetic Resource Conserva-
tion under the Convention on Biological Diversity, in WIDENING PERSPECTIVE ON
BIODIVERSITY 255, 257 (Anatole F. Kratigger et al. eds., 1994).
44. See RicHARD FALK, EXPLORATIONS AT THE EDGE OF TIME (1992).
45. For a description of this level of citizen involvement and Federal agency
rulemaking in the US related to biodiversity conservation, see Robert L. Fisch-
man, Biological Diversity and Environmental Protection: Authorities to Reduce
Risk, 22 ENVTL. L. 435 (1992).
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they have not already done so, and apply them to biological
diversity. States with experience in domestic impact assess-
ment could assist other States in the development of such re-
gimes, if they so request. Private parties and government
agencies can voluntarily subject their activities to environ-
mental impact assessment procedures, whether required by
law or not. An example is where ecologists are trying to mini-
mize the impact on fragile ecosystems of ecotourism, which is
otherwise desirable due to the many economic and aesthetic
benefits of such travel to the host nation and to the traveller.
At the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment
and Development (UNCED), participating States affirmed
the importance of environmental impact assessment (EIA)
procedures as an integral part of the development process. 46
Currently, more than seventy-five States require EIA as a
matter of domestic law. In addition, international organiza-
tions, such as the World Bank, have adopted EIA procedures
as part of their decision-making process. The popularity of
EIA is due, in large measure, to its usefulness in providing
environmental information to decision-makers from people
outside government or business who are proponents of the
project. While EIA procedures often provide local communi-
ties that might be affected by a project with the opportunity
to participate in the decision-making process, 47 following the
procedure does not always guarantee effectiveness in antici-
pating and mitigating the adverse environmental impacts of
development projects.
E. Duty to Create National Biodiversity Plans
The Treaty does not mandate anything resembling global
resource management, and does not create any institutional
46. See Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Princ. 17, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.151/5 (1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 874 (1992). Principle 17
states, "[e]nvironmental impact assessment, as a national instrument, shall be
undertaken for proposed activities that are likely to have a significant adverse
impact on the environment and are subject to a decision of a competent national
authority." Id.
47. See generally Nicholas A. Robinson, International Trends in Environ-
mental Impact Assessment, 19 B.C. ENrrL. AFF. L. REv. 591 (1992).
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entity which could accomplish such a task. However, the
Convention does require Contracting Parties to draw up na-
tional biodiversity plans and strategies, including national
legislation, to implement the Convention. The Convention
also establishes the right of universal access to genetic re-
sources, regardless of their physical location within territo-
rial boundaries of nation-states, and combines it with access
to transfer of technologies and financial resources to meet the
Convention's obligations.48
The benefit-sharing provision is another break-through,
recognizing the global imperative to share both products and
profits from life-saving medications, nutritionally adequate
and improved foods, and the raw materials for further devel-
opment of such products. Once these basic premises of re-
sponsibility and sharing are accepted, as they are in the final
text of the Convention on Biological Diversity, it is then the
responsibility of diplomats, politicians, and ordinary citizens
to find the means to achieve these ends, using traditional
knowledge as well as the most advanced science available to
us. Greater international cooperation will benefit those who
participate; those who choose not to share need not cooperate,
however, they will be denied access to the resources the
others have. In a mutually interdependent world, such "play
it alone" tactics will not work for long.
III. Legal Duties to Equitably Share the Benefits of
Biodiversity
A. Transfer of Technology
One example of biotechnology is the "Flavr-savr" toma-
toes,49 genetically engineered tomatoes which vine-ripen and
do not rot by the time they reach the market. Another exam-
ple is bovine growth hormones used in cows to increase pro-
duction of milk.50 These techniques alter nature through
48. Biological Diversity, supra note 1, art. 15.
49. See AGBIO News: FLAVOR SAVR Tomato, APPLIED GENETICS NEWS,
Apr. 1993.
50. Interim Voluntary Guidance on BST Issued by FDA for Milk Producers,
17 Chemical Reg. Rep. (BNA) 1916 (Feb. 11, 1994).
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genetic engineering and gene splicing. Biotechnology has
been used as long as there have been humans on this planet
cross-breeding plants and animals. The farmer uses biotech-
nology in creating hybrid seeds and breeding animals for im-
proved qualities. In one sense, the practice is very ancient
and, in another sense, it is very new. Biotechnology is one
option or means of achieving the conservation and sustaina-
ble use of biodiversity.
The transfer of technology aspect of the Treaty probably
has the best capacity to fulfill the goals of the Treaty, so long
as handled in a voluntary way with the cooperation of the
private sector in providing the best appropriate technology.States can support, encourage, and assist the private sector
in the transfer of technology in ways that are beneficial to the
entire planet. The Treaty does not clearly mandate that a
government go to a private corporation and force it to turn
over certain technology for transfer to a developing nation.
Private sector groups and companies have an incentive to co-
operate because, in return, they acquire access to genetic re-
sources, which they desire and need for commercial growth
and profits in market economics. Thus, the transfer of tech-
nology is a two-way street.
In addition, many developing nations have sources of
traditional knowledge and ways of using resources sustain-
ably, as well as, technology that can be transferred to the de-
veloped world. Technology transfer refers not only to
industrial technology being transferred from developed to de-
veloping countries, but also to traditional or appropriate tech-
nology being transferred from developing to developed
countries. It may not be the most sophisticated or expensive
technology that is needed to conserve biodiversity; in many
situations low-cost, low-technology solutions may be best.
In return for access to genetic resources, the Treaty pro-
vides for the transfer of environmentally-sound and relevant
technologies and financing for projects related to achieving
the objectives of the Convention. For those States rich in
technology and finances (principally in the developed world),
there is an incentive to contribute these economic resources
for conserving and sustainably using biological diversity in
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those States richest in genetic resources (principally in the
developing world). The incentive for developed countries is
the right of access to genetic resources, an economically valu-
able item, and the raw material necessary to the continued
growth of pharmaceutical companies and agribusiness in de-
veloped countries. The incentive for developing countries to
meet their Treaty obligations is to equitably share in the ben-
efits of the use of biodiversity, by providing for compensation
in the form of royalties for products derived from traditional
knowledge and the knowledge of indigenous people and local
communities. Hence, the Convention recognizes that technol-
ogy transfer goes both ways. As a result, we all gain-the
human and other populations of the globe and the planet it-
self-from compliance with the norm of conservation and
sustainable use of biological diversity.
B. Financing
A highly contentious issue continues to be the choice of a
financial mechanism under the Convention. The financial
burden of compliance with these treaty obligations for devel-
oping States is obvious, especially if they are being asked to
forego economic development, because it is destructive of bi-
odiversity. Thus, the financial mechanism established under
the Treaty5' is necessary to fund projects of this nature. At
the final negotiating session on the Treaty, the Global Envi-
ronment Facility (GEF), a joint project of the World Bank,
UNDP, and UNEP, was adopted as an interim financial
mechanism, despite severe opposition from many developing
nations.
Developed countries, as the major donors, generally favor
the GEF, with its weighted voting system. Developing coun-
tries by and large remain skeptical, regardless of whether the
recent restructuring of the GEF can address their fundamen-
tal objections to the lack of transparency and democracy in
the body. Alternative financial mechanisms have been pro-
posed by some states, including an independent biodiversity
fund under the Convention or a UNEP biodiversity trust
51. Biological Diversity, supra note 1, art. 21.
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fund, both of which could accommodate contributions from
NGOs and individuals as well as governments.52
IV. Unresolved Issues
To comply with the Convention, each State must collect
data on genes, species, and habitats occurring within its
boundaries and to conserve genetic resources both in situ in
protected areas and ex situ in gene banks, preferably within
the country of origin of the specimens. Unresolved, however,
is the question of ownership of, access to, and allocation of
scarce resources for ex situ conservation. For example, the
herbarium at Kew Gardens in London, England, is a model
repository of plant specimens from around the globe, which
are preserved under optimal conditions.
The herbarium of Kiev, now the Ukraine, has many spec-
imens from the region, but the government has had no funds
for many years to preserve the collection. The importance of
the collection in Kiev, and a compelling argument for main-
taining ex situ collections, both in the Ukraine and in London,
can be illustrated by the nuclear accident at Chernobyl.
Plants growing in the area of the disaster were measured for
radioactivity and compared to specimens held in Kiev which
had been collected prior to the accident. DNA from the Kiev
specimens was studied to watch for any mutations appearing
in the plants growing around Chernobyl after the accident.
Had the nuclear accident affected Kiev, the herbarium there
could have been destroyed, illustrating the need for a facility
such as Kew Gardens, even if local facilities exist. Each col-
lection may preserve different specimens, or provide greater
context for the collection. This treasure house of genetic ma-
terial is simply too precious for the survival of life on our
52. No donor States have committed to make contributions to any financial
mechanism other than the GEF. To date, total pledges to GEF replenishment
over the next four years total $2 billion, of which some $430 million is to come
from the United States. These funds are not dedicated exclusively to biodivers-
ity, however, as GEF funds projects on climate change, ozone, and other areas
in addition to biodiversity. See Convention on Biological Diversity, 1994: Hear-
ing Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 103rd Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1994)
(statement of Timothy Wirth, Counselor, Department of State).
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planet to take chances with it. Of course, international fund-
ing to protect the specimens at Kiev from disintegration
should be provided both to foster the local research and as a
backup to facilities like Kew Gardens.
The Convention on Biological Diversity suggests a mech-
anism for seeking such funding through the financing provi-
sions of the Treaty. The goal of such a project is clearly in
line with the conservation provisions of the Treaty, specifi-
cally Article 7 Identification and Monitoring, Article 9 Ex situ
Conservation, and Article 12 Research and Training. One of
the open issues for discussion at the first Conference of the
Parties, and probably at many others still to come, is the
question of ownership of seed banks and other ex situ collec-
tions of genetic resources, and who has access to them. The
previous work of the Food & Agriculture Oragnization's In-
ternational Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources 53 may
need to be renegotiated to bring it into harmony with the
Convention on Biological Diversity regarding ownership of
and access to ex situ genetic resources, as well as farmers'
rights.
Another major concern, which was part of each meeting
of the negotiating body and the ICCBDs, and which will un-
doubtedly continue to appear on the agenda of successive
Conferences of Parties, is that of biosafety and the need for a
protocol on the subject.54 There appear to be two camps now,
the G-77 and the OECD. The G-77 and other nations con-
cerned about the release of untested or uncontrollable geneti-
cally modified organisms within their territory, want strict
regulations and rules to avoid disaster. For years the United
States has strictly maintained that there is no danger at all
from biotechnology, and therefore, no need for a protocol.
This position has been modified by the OECD countries, gen-
erally to that of a gradual approach to the question of regula-
tion, with the EU in support of drawing up short-term
technical guidelines on biosafety. This issue, of course, raises
53. International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources, Report of the
Council of FAO, at 71-75, U.N. Doc. C84IREP (1983).
54. The treaty contains one article on how biotechnology should be handled
and its benefits distributed. Biological Diversity, supra note 1, art. 19.
1995] 213
23
214 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13
ethical and socio-economic questions related to genetic altera-
tion and the locus of decision-making power. For example,
news accounts from a consumer perspective have highlighted
concerns over the use of bovine growth hormone and its effect
on milk and beef for human consumption. Additionally, other
concerns have been raised over the labelling of genetically-
engineered tomatoes and other foods. Scientific debate, as
well as ethical and moral concerns, have been raised about
destroying the small-pox virus, which is technically feasible.
It remains to be seen what action on transfer of technol-
ogy and intellectual property rights is specifically required of
each State party to the Treaty in relation to the private sector
within its boundaries or in relation to multinational corpora-
tions operating within the State's boundaries. Such ques-
tions are broadly subject to the Biodiversity Treaty's article
on "Jurisdictional Scope."55 A corporation holding a patent to
technology relevant to the goals of the Treaty may not want
to relocate its plant or research labs to a developing country
which lacks infrastructure, or may not want to transfer tech-
nology to anyone within a nation which lacks legal protection
for intellectual property. If a government wants to force that
patent-holder to transfer the technology, what must be trans-
ferred: only the final product; or managers and technical con-
sultants to advise local producers; or the entire
manufacturing process and machinery? The Convention of-
fers little or no guidance since the language of the Treaty
must be implemented through national legislation and, in
fact, appears to be contradictory within sections of key arti-
cles like Articles 15 and 16. One less desireable answer to
this hypothetical is to decide that the government of the State
where the corporation has its principal place of business need
do nothing, because there is no "mutual agreement" as re-
quired by Article 15, and therefore no transfer of technology
is mandatory under the Treaty.
Another option is to interpret the requirement that Con-
tracting Parties "provide and/or facilitate" the transfer of
technology to mean that the government should encourage its
55. Biological Diversity, supra note 1, art. 4.
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private sector to comply through one of a range of escalating
measures, both positive, such as tax incentives or ecosystem
trading permits, and negative, such as public or private ex-
hortations, threat of sanction, denial of export licenses or gov-
ernment contracts. A final option would be compulsory
licensing of the technology by a national government.56 This
would make the technology freely available to the public in
the place from which access to genetic resources is sought.
Obviously, this option raises many fears and questions about
compensation to the patent-holder, the extent of the duty,
and its breadth of applicability, whether to all companies
from the State of which the patent-holder is a national or only
to that patent-holder. 57 In actuality, many companies may
wish to voluntarily transfer relevant technology to some de-
gree in order to capitalize on a business opportunity. Others
may propose to share their patented technology in return for
payment from a government or from the financing mecha-
nism established under the Convention, depending on how
the eligibility requirements are drafted and at what price
level compensation is set. A monopoly may not want to ac-
cept a payment the financing mechanism considers adequate
or fair. Practice will no doubt calm many fears, and others
can be addressed by clarifications when the Conference of the
Parties meets.
At the time of the signing of the Convention in Rio in
June, 1992, several States filed declarations to explain their
position or highlight remaining areas of contention in inter-
preting the language just adopted in the final text. Malaysia,
for example, entered a declaration objecting to the language
of Article 16(2) asserting that it failed to reflect its insistence
56. The Treaty language does not require the government of the State of
which the patent-holder is a national to compel the transfer of technology be-
cause of the limitation in Article 4 on "Jurisdictional Scope" regarding activities
in the territory of another state. Therefore, compulsory licensing or expropria-
tion would only be done, if at all, by the government of a State where the pat-
ent-holder is operating as a foreign national. Biological Diversity, supra note 1,
art. 4.
57. When the U.S. refused to sign the Convention at Rio in 1992, the gov-
ernment of Venezuela responded by expelling those American companies then
involved in biodiversity prospecting in Venezuela.
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that the transfer of technology must be on concessional and
preferential terms. The United States did not sign the treaty
at all in Rio contending that the text was "seriously flawed" in
several areas, including transfer of technology and intellec-
tual property rights provisions. 58
Some of the confusion in the text of the Treaty stems
from the last-minute adoption of subparagraphs necessary to
complete the negotiations and have a final document ready
for signing during the Earth Summit. Some confusion is also
related to the failure of the negotiators to identify and resolve
their position on a fundamental underlying question related
to intellectual property rights: whether legal regimes pro-
tecting private property rights in inventions and discoveries
help conserve and sustainably use biological diversity, or do
these laws hurt the objectives of the Treaty? Absent a con-
sensus on this question, which clearly was not present or in
Nairobi at the final negotiating session or subsequently, it is
difficult to interpret the language of Articles 15 and 16 in
light of the Article objectives of the Treaty.
The use of the best and most appropriate technology is
one way to conserve and sustainably use biological diversity.
This functions by reducing the destructive effect of human ac-
tivity on genetic resources in situations where clearly some
technology is going to be used and will alter an ecosystem.
The goal is to limit the effect of the human activity on the
ecosystem to as great an extent as possible by using the most
modern processes, materials and products available. Inevita-
bly, these will be protected by patents in developed countries.
In this scenario, the task is to facilitate the transfer of this
technology. An example related to biodiversity is the policy
decision by the Chinese government to build the Three
Gorges Dam,5 9 which floods out villages, displace persons,
and destroy priceless archeological sites with artifacts related
to one of the earliest stages of Chinese civilization. Archaeol-
ogists excavating sites which will be destroyed forever have
58. The U.S. signed a year later, on June 4, 1992, but has not yet ratified
the Convention.
59. Kevin Huyser, Note, Sustainable Development: Rhetoric and Reform at
the World Bank, 4 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 253, 270-71 (1994).
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compared this to the building of the Aswan Dam, and have
asked for aid and contributions from the international com-
munity to remove some of the treasures before the waters
rise.60 The Chinese government, while assisting the excava-
tions, is concerned with providing hydroelectric power for the
economic growth of the nation and the electrification of Chi-
nese homes. 61 If this policy decision is consistent with the
obligations of conservation and sustainable use under the
Convention, then the question of the transfer of the best
available technology from whatever source should be
addressed.
Access to technology is linked to access to genetic re-
sources in the Treaty, but require complex legislation and ad-
ministrative programs in many nations that currently lack
such legal and institutional capacity. Such legislation, for ex-
ample, must authorize government officials to enter into ma-
terial transfer agreements with foreign corporations; to
develop provisions for restricting resale of uses of biological
resources or licensing their use; and to prohibit unauthorized
transactions or uses of biodiversity. For example, a private
contract between Merck and INBIO, 62 a quasi-governmental
research institute in Costa Rica, has often been described as
a model of cooperation, whereby parataxonomists trained by
INBI0 from local communities locate plant specimens for
Merck, which then has the right to export them. In addition
to a lump-sum initial payment, Merck has promised to pay a
small percentage of royalties from any commercially-success-
ful drugs resulting from genetic material extracted from IN-
BIO plants. There are several unresolved questions which
may limit the utility of this model as a panacea, including the
current inability to identify the source of genetic material to
support a claim for royalties in the future; issues relating to
protection of traditional lifestyles and knowledge and com-
pensation for the use of its benefits; and ethical and moral as
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. See Michael D. Coughlin, Jr., Using the Merck-INBIO Agreement to
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well as economic issues arising from "biodiversity
prospecting."
From a legal standpoint, there are a number of theoreti-
cal questions underpinning the language of the Treaty which
remain unanswered and unanalyzed, which may plague ef-
forts to interpret or implement the Convention. 63 Interna-
tional lawyers, diplomats and NGOs will need to consider and
closely analyze topics such as the following: the inherent ten-
sion between sovereign rights and responsibility as contained
in Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration; the anthropo-
centric focus of the Treaty and the Rio Declaration, which is
contrary to non-hierarchical concepts of diversity. In addi-
tion, these parties must consider scientific knowledge as the
basis of law and policy where the data base does not exist or
cannot yet be interpreted, and the application of the precau-
tionary principle, which suggests that the only way to con-
serve and sustainably use biological diversity with certainty
may be to avoid its use until further scientific knowledge
develops.
63. To illustrate the US government view of difficulties under the Conven-
tion, see generally Chandler, supra note 36.
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